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Hospital Liability for Negligence
By RAYMOND L. HANSON*

AND Ross

E. STROMBERGt

HISTORICALLY an individual who desired to hold a hospital liable
for an injury to him had two obstacles to overcome. In the first place,
he had to be able to bring suit against the hospital; second, he had to
prove that his injury was caused by a negligent act for which the hospital was legally responsible. As this article will attempt to point out,
these obstacles are being steadily broken down, and the chances of an
injured patient maintaining a successful action against a hospital are
steadily improving. An examination will also be made of some of the
far-reaching implications of this process, with particular attention to the
question whether, given this trend, negligence is still a viable doctrine
for allocating the burden of legal liability.
Hospital Immunity
Charitable Immunity
The first problem an injured individual faces is whether he can
bring suit against the hospital in which the injury occurred. This problem is posed by the doctrines of charitable and governmental immunity
from tort liability.
Although a majority of states at one time recognized the doctrine
of immunity from tort liability of charitable (or nonprofit) institutions,'
and hospitals in particular, presently most states have wholly rejected
the doctrine.'
At least four theories have been developed by courts to justify the
doctrine of charitable immunity. The theory most relied upon has been
the trust fund theory, which holds generally that the funds of a charity
constitute a trust and that payment of tort claims would act as a diversion to specific individuals of such funds from the charitable purposes
* Member, California Bar.
t Member, California Bar.
The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Richard Jensen, J.D.,

Hastings College of the Law (1969), and James J. Pandell, LL.B., Stanford University
(1969), in the preparation of this article.
1. W. PRossE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 1020 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2. The status of the law is set forth in PRossER § 127 at 1021-24.
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for which they were intended. 3 Several states using this theory have
made recovery against the charity depend on the presence of nontrust assets-that is, property not directly and exclusively utilized in
the charity's work, including proceeds from liability insurance or
sometimes income-producing commercial property. 4 As one writer has
pointed out, this determination has no more than a conceptual consistency with the trust fund theory of immunity, which rests on preserving
the charity by safeguarding its trust assets.5 The funds used by the charity to purchase liability insurance are, in essence, a diversion of trust
assets from charitable uses to pay personal injury claims; and the use of
nontrust assets, such as commercial rental property, to satisfy a tort
judgment leads to a loss of revenue to the institution. The loss adversely
affects its ability to perform its charitable functions and causes an
indirect depletion of its trust funds.
Under another theory, the implied waiver theory, it is argued that a
beneficiary of a charity, such as a hospital patient, assumes the risk of
negligence by the charity and impliedly waives his right to recover for
harm incurred when he accepts the charity's benefits.' Recovery in some
states using this theory depends on the relationship of the injured person
to the charitable institution. In these states immunity is denied the hospital only where the injury is incurred by a "beneficiary," that is, a
hospital patient, and granted where the injury is incurred by an employee or a stranger. The last category includes visitors, private nurses,
7
and private patients of physicians renting office space in the hospital.
Most states recognizing charitable immunity, however, do not
distinguish between paying and nonpaying patients, since all patients
are recipients of the charity; payments made by patients for treatment
are devoted to the overall charitable work of the hospital, and not to
profit.'
A third theory advanced to support charitable immunity is that
3. Id. at 1020.
4. Horty, The Status of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity in Hospital Cases,
25 OHIO ST. L.J. 343, 345 (1964).

5.

Id.

6.

See Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hosp., 109 F. 294, 303-04 (1st

Cir. 1901); Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 361, 82 P.2d
849, 853-54 (1938); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 354-55, 144 N.E. 537,
541-42 (1924); Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Ky. App. 1954);

Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium Benev. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 163-64, 137 N.W.
1120 (1912).
7. See cases cited in PROSSFR § 127, at 1022 n.59. See also Horty, supra note 4,
at 346.

8. Horty, supra note 4, at 347.
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the doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the negligent act
is done to aid the master (here, the hospital) in making a profit;9 and,
of course, charitable institutions are, by definition, not-for-profit institutions. The states adopting this theory impose liability on the hospital
only when the hospital is itself negligent, and recognize immunity when
the hospital's employees are negligent;1" the nature of the negligent act,
therefore, determines the extent of charitable immunity.
A fourth, general public policy theory has been advanced to support charitable immunity. Now an anachronism, this theory was based
on the argument that the beneficiary, the patient, must suffer his injuries
without compensation so that the hospital might not be damaged.1
Regardless of the theory used, however, the charitable institution is
not immune when the particular activity resulting in the injury is of a
commercial nature, even though the revenues from such activity were
or would be devoted entirely to charitable purposes. 2
The doctrine of charitable immunity, when it first appeared in the
United States in 1876,13 developed primarily because charitable institutions could not financially withstand the cost of litigation and tort liability. 4 Such a doctrine has little application to the modem hospital,
however;' 5 and there is no evidence of a greater crippling of charities or
an increased deterrence to donations in non-immunity states than in
immunity states.10 In essence, the significant financial consideration
to the hospital is the cost of the liability insurance premium and not
the potential full award of damages. This added cost of insurance,
while an increasing burden as described below,17 is hardly a sufficient
reason to justify imposing on innocent victims the burdens of their
plight. Therefore, whatever need charitable immunity formerly met,
it has had its day, as many states have recognized.
9. E.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595 (1895).
10. E.g., Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 172 A.2d 192
(1961); Peden v. Furman Univ., 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930); Roberts v. Ohio
Valley Gen. Hosp., 98 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925); Smith v. Congregation of
St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896 (1953).
11. See cased cited in PROSSER § 127, at 1021 n.43.
12. See cases cited id. at 1022 nn.52-55.
13. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
14. See id.
15. In 1968, for example, total hospital assets in the United States exceeded 31
billion dollars. 43 HosPrrALs 474, Table 1 (Aug. 1969) (Journal of the American
Hospital Asociation).
16. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 823
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Cohen v. General Hosp. Soe'y, 113 Conn. 188, 192-93, 154 A. 435,
436-37 (1931).
17. See text accompanying notes 130-132 infra.
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Governmental Immunity
The immunity of governmental hospitals from tort liability is
based on the general proposition that the government cannot be sued
for the negligent acts of its agents or employees unless it consents to
such suit. 8 Although this doctrine, like the doctrine of charitable immunity, is being increasingly abandoned by state courts, 19 it has proved
more resilient than charitable immunity and is still the rule in the majority of states."
Thus state hospitals are generally immune from tort
liability unless such immunity is waived by statute, as it is in several
states. "
The immunity of hospitals of political subdivisions of the
state-counties, districts, and municipal corporations-is far more restricted than the immunity of state hospitals. The hospitals of political
subdivisions of the state are held in a number of states to be immune from
tort liability only when the subdivision, in operating the hospital, is
engaged in a governmental, rather than proprietary function.2 2 A hospital is said to be engaged in a governmental function when its acts are
performed for the good of the public as a whole, and the benefits from
these acts extend beyond the corporate limits of the subdivision.23
On the other hand, a hospital is said to be engaged in a proprietary
function when its benefits are specially limited to the corporate boundaries of the political subdivision. 4
In making this distinction, some courts hold that where a statute
imposes a mandatory duty on the political subdivision to establish a
hospital, the function is a governmental one; but if the statute is merely
permissive, authorizing but not requiring the establishment of a hospital, the function may be a proprietary one.2 5 Other courts center
18. Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960); Lewis v. State, 96
N.Y. 71 (1884).
"[T]he origin of the idea ... in the common law seems to have been the theory,
allied with the divine right of kings, that 'the King can do no wrong,' together with the
feeling that it was necessarily a contradiction of his sovereignty to allow him to be sued
as of right in his own courts." PROSSER § 125, at 996.
19. A good discussion of this trend may be found in Muskopf v. Coming Hosp.
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213-17, 359 P.2d 457, 458-60, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90-92 (1961).
20. For a state-by-state analysis, see HA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch.
HI, at 20-29 (1968).
21. Id. The immunity of federal hospitals has been waived to a large degree by
the Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1945. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680
(1958).
22. IIA HOSPITAL LAW MANuAL, Negligence ch. I, at 14-15 (1959).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. E.g., Wittmer v. Litts, 248 Iowa 648, 80 N.W.2d 561 (1957). See also HA
HosprrAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 14-15 (1959).
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the discussion of whether the operation of a hospital is a governmental
or proprietary function upon whether the hospital admits paying patients. These courts hold either that those particular patients who pay
may sue the hospital for negligence,2 6 or that the mere admission of
some paying patients renders the entire operation of the hospital a
proprietary function regardless of the status of the particular patient in-

jured
The doctrine of governmental immunity, especially when applied
to the hospital, is as unsatisfactory and anachronistic as the doctrine of
charitable immunity. However practical the doctrine may have been
when government was limited in its activities and revenues, it is no
longer so under the modem conditions of enormous government revenues and the greatly expanded role of the government in the hospital
field. In addition, the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions (which, for example, generally deems the operation of a
hospital to be a governmental function,28 but the paving and cleaning
of streets to be a proprietary one)2 9 is technical, unrealistic, and unjustified. The primary reason for the slower demise of this doctrine
than the doctrine of charitable immunity is that even courts expressing
dissatisfaction with the doctrine hold the view that the abrogation of
such a long-held precedent should be by legislative rather than judicial
action. 0 This view is perhaps justified. In California, after the California Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity in
the 1961 case of Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District,3 1 the state legislature passed a two year moratorium to enable itself to examine the entire immunity question."2 Following the moratorium the legislature
enacted comprehensive legislation that restored, with some significant
exceptions, the general rule of governmental immunity. 3
Respondeat Superior and Corporate Negligence
Once the injured individual is able to bring suit against the hos26. Suwanee County Hosp. Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
27. Stolp v. Arkansas City, 180 Kan. 197, 303 P.2d 123 (1956); Anderson v.
Portland, 130 Me. 214, 154 A. 572 (1931).
28. HA HosPrrAL LAw MANuAL, Negligence ch. III, at 16 (1959).
29. See cases cited in PROSSER § 125, at 1008 n.20.
30. Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 242, 353 P.2d 609, 610 (1960).
31. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
32. Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, at 3209; see Coming Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d 325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1962); Thelander v. Superior Court,
58 Cal. 2d 828, 376 P.2d 571, 26 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1962).
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815, 815.2. For a discussion and analysis of this
legislation, see Note, Notes on the California Tort Claims Act, 19 HAST. L.J. 561 (1968).

6
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pital, and as we have seen, he is able to do so in an increasing number
of cases, he must then prove that his injury was caused by a negligent
act for which the hospital is legally liable. Hospital liability for negligence is based on either of two theories: corporate negligence or
4
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.1
Respondeat Superior
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer is liable for
the tort of an employee committed within the scope of his employment.3 5
For the purposes of hospital liability the central question under this
doctrine is: Who is a hospital "employee"? Because the employer is
not vicariously liable for the negligence of a person over whom it has
no right of control, i.e., an independent contractor,3 6 the traditional
test has been the employer's right to control the employee's conduct in
the performance of his duties.3 7
In general, because he has a direct contractual relationship with the
patient and because the hospital has no right to control his conduct
while he is administering the patient, the staff doctor has been considered an independent contracter. 38 Courts have found hospitals not
liable for the acts of such physicians even though the physicians were
shareholders or officers of the hospital.3 9 In this regard, some courts
have made a clear distinction between the professional and managerial
duties of the physician and have refused to hold the hospital liable where
the physician is acting in his professional capacity.40 A few courts,
however, have held that if the physician is paid a salary by the hospital,
he is a servant of the hospital for purposes of respondeat superior, even
34. IIA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 1 (1968).
35. P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 349, at 237 (4th ed. 1952).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1957). See also P. MECHEM,
supra note 35, § 427, at 288.
37. See id. § 371; IIA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 2-3 (1968).
38. See Barfield v. South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 559, 68 So. 30, 33
(1915); Mayers v. Litow & Midway Hosp., 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 417-18, 316 P.2d

351, 354 (1957); Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 366, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944);
Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 111-12, 117 S.E. 103, 103-04 (1923); Jeter v.
Davis-Fischer Sanitarium Co., 28 Ga. App. 708, 711, 113 S.E. 29, 30 (1922); Holland
v. Eugene Hosp., 127 Ore. 256, 261-62, 270 P. 784, 786 (1928); Kuglich v. Fowle, 185
Wis. 124, 126-27, 200 N.W. 648, 649 (1924).
39. Barfield v. South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915); Teter
v. Davis-Fischer Sanitarium Co., 28 Ga. App. 708, 113 S.E. 29 (1922); Kuglich v.

Fowle, 185 Wis. 124, 200 N.W. 648 (1924).
40. IIA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 3 (1957); see Barfield v.
South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 559, 68 So. 30, 33 (1915); Kuglich v. Fowle,
185 Wis. 124, 126-27, 200 N.W. 648, 649 (1924).
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though such employment may not give the hospital any right to control
the physician's professional acts.41
In 1955, the California Supreme Court, in the leading case of
Seneris v. Haas,42 made yet another inroad into the independent contractor doctrine by announcing the doctrine of apparent or ostensible
agency. The court held that if the hospital leads the patient to believe that a professional person is its employee, then it may be held
liable for his negligence. 43 The case concerned an anesthesiologist who
worked at no other hospital and who was one of six anesthesiologists
on the staff of the defendant hospital. The hospital had procured the
services of the physician for the patient, although the doctor himself
billed the patient. The court held that it was a jury question whether
or not the patient was led to believe that the professional individual was
an employee of the institution. 44 This doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency has been applied by several other courts, 5 including the
Montana Supreme Court in the 1966 case of Kober v. Stewart.46 In
that case, the hospital's X-ray department was operated under contract
with a private clinic. The clinic supplied a qualified radiologist as the
department's director and was paid 35 percent of the gross receipts. The
hospital hired all X-ray technicians, owned the equipment, and made
the charge to the patient. The patient had no contract with the radiologist; the hospital called the doctor to read the patient's films. The
court held that it was error for the trial court to give a summary judgment for the hospital on the ground that the radiologist was an independent contractor,47 and that it was an issue of fact for the jury to
48
determine whether or not the doctor was an agent of the hospital.
The doctrine of apparent agency reflects the judicial antipathy
toward, and illustrates the judicial circumvention of the independent
contractor doctrine. There is no apparent significance in whether or
not the relationship between the physician and the hospital is such that
the public believes that the physician is acting as the hospital's agent;
nevertheless, the doctrine of apparent agency has hastened the de41. Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanitorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S.W.2d 249
(1929); Vaughn v. Memorial Hosp., 100 W.Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925).
42. 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
43. Id. at 831-32, 291 P.2d at 927.
44. id.
45. See Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App. 2d 141,
146, 128 P.2d 705, 708 (1942); Middleton v. Frances, 257 Ky. 42, 44, 77 S.W.2d 425,
426 (1934); Agnew v. Mullenix, 11 So. 2d 106, 107 (La. App. 1942).
46. 417 P.2d 476 (Mont. 1966).
47. Id. at 478-79.
48. Id. at 479-80.
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mise of the independent contractor doctrine.
Resident and intern physicians (as opposed to staff doctors) are
generally considered to be employees" for whose negligence the hospital is liable.5" Because the resident or intern is not employed by the
patient and is usually on salary, courts generally apply respondeat superior without discussing the element of control.15
Nurses are clearly employees of the hospital when performing
their routine nursing functions, and even when performing professional
acts.5 2 The nurse's duties to the patient as an employee of the hospital include the duty to challenge and inquire into a physician's judgment if she, as a professional, knows or should know that the physician's
orders are wrong or unclear. In a recent (1967) Kentucky case, Arnold v. Haggin Memorial Hospital,5 3 two nurses, in accordance with the
orders of the patient's doctor, forced the protesting patient to get out of
bed following a hysterectomy and walk in the corridor for exercise.
While being walked, she fell and allegedly sustained a ruptured disk.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that although the nurses were acting
in accordance with the orders of the patient's physician, this did not
excuse them from using their independent judgment for the patient's
protection. 54 The court ruled that the question of whether or not the
nurses should have followed the physician's orders in view of plaintiff's protestations and condition should have been submitted to the
jury.5" The 1962 Louisiana case of Norton v. Argonaut Insurance
Co.5 6 focused on the additional responsibility of a nurse to obtain
clarification of an ambiguous order from the patient's physician.
The infant patient had been receiving the drug digitalis orally. On one
particular occasion, the doctor (who, incidentally, was also found to be
negligent) wrote a prescription as follows: "Give 3 cc. lanoxin today
for one dose only." 57 Apparently he intended the medication to be administered in oral form; but the nurse gave it by injection and it proved
to be a fatal overdose. The nurse had not called the attending doctor
for clarification; she was not even aware that the drug came in the oral
form. She was, however, aware that the prescription was a large dose;
49. HA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 8-11 (1962).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 11-14b.
53. 415 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1967).
54. Id. at 466.
55.
56.
57.

See id.
144 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
Id. at 259-60.
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indeed, she had asked two other doctors for clarification and they told
her, in effect, that if the prescribing physician ordered the medication
then she should administer the prescription. The nurse (and thus the
hospital) was held liable for failing to obtain a clarification of the
prescription from the patient's physician. 8
There is one important caveat to the general rule of the liability of
a hospital for the negligence of residents, interns, nurses, and other
hospital employees. Under the borrowed servant doctrine, some courts
have held that such a hospital employee may temporarily become an
employee under the control and supervision of the attending physician
who himself is an independent contractor. This new employer becomes
liable for the negligence of the employee under respondeat superior
and the hospital is insulated from liability.59
That the doctor orders treatment clearly does not make a person
carrying out the order the borrowed servant of the physician; as stated
previously, 0 such an employee must use his independent judgment in
protecting the patient, or else the hospital will be vicariously liable.
In the operating room, however, when the surgeon by necessity must
be in exclusive and complete control of all surgical personnel in the
room, the borrowed servant doctrine may apply. 61 Under the older,
more extreme form of this doctrine, the surgeon is "Captain of the
Ship" and hence responsible for all that goes on within the operating
room. Thus in a 1949 Pennsylvania case, McConnell v. Williams, 2
a surgeon completing a caesarian section was held liable for the negligent act of an intern who had been assigned the task of putting silver
nitrate in the eyes of the newborn infant. In actuality, the surgeon had
no physical control over the intern's act;63 but the court said that he had
ultimate supervisory control and the right and responsibility to give
orders to the intern. 4
Courts, however, are abandoning the "Captain of the Ship" doctrine and are increasingly holding the hospital liable in these situations.
For example, several courts have held the hospital, and not the surgeon,
liable under respondeat superior for the negligence of an operating
58. Id. at 260-61. A hospital is also liable for the negligence of its other employees (including hospital pharmacists and non-professional employees, such as orderlies). HA HosPrrAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 18-19 (1967).
59. HA HosPrrAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 14b-16 (1967).
60. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
61. HA HosPrrAL LAw MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 14b (1967).
62. 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
63. See id. at 358-59, 65 A.2d at 244-45.
64. Id. at 362-63, 65 A.2d at 246-47.
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room nurse in making an improper sponge count.6 5 The theory underlying these holdings has been that just because the surgeon is in
complete charge of the operating room and the personnel within and has
ordered some act to be performed for his patient by a hospital nurse, the
nurse does not necessarily become the physician's temporary servant,
thereby relieving the hospital of all responsibility for the nurse's act. 66
Instead, the character of the act performed by the nurse is important in
determining liability. The physician should be able to rely upon the
nurse to perform routine operating room acts, such as making the
sponge count, that are a part of her usual and customary duties as an
employee of the hospital. Only where the hospital truly surrenders
direction and control over the nurse to the physician and where her
acts involve professional decisions on the part of the surgeon, is it no
longer liable as the employer for the nurse's negligence."
A 1966 New York case, Matlick v. Long Island Jewish Hos68
pital, completely abandoned the concept of the borrowed servant
doctrine. In that case, a hospital employee participating in a surgical
operation was held to be under the concurrent control of the hospital and
an independent anesthesiologist, on the ground that a given employee
can serve the mutual interests of two employers at the same time, and
that both employers can be liable for the employee's negligence.
Thus, the borrowed servant exception to the doctrine of respondeat
superior also seems to be a dying defense for the hospital.69 This,
coupled with the increasing restrictions on the independent contractor
defense, reflects the growing number of situations in which the hospital
is being held liable under respondeat superior for the torts of its employees or apparent employees.
65. E.g., Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945);
Rural Educational Ass'n v. Bush, 42 Tenn. App. 34, 298 S.W.2d 761 (1956).
66. See Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 303-04, 163 P.2d
860, 865 (1945).
67. Swigard v. Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956). In the course
of its opinion the Minnesota court explained its rule in the following manner:
"[A] hospital is liable for the negligence of its nurses in performing mere administrative or clerical acts, which acts, though constituting a part of patient's prescribed
medical treatment, do not require the application of the specialized technique or the
understanding of a skilled physician or surgeon. This rule, in recognizing that the
right of control remains with the hospital as the general employer, is consistent with
the nature of such acts and is in accord with the custom which in everyday practice
governs the relationship between the hospital staff and the attending physicians. It is

generally recognized that the nature of the acts performed, and the custom as to the
control ordinarily exercised in the performance of similar acts, are factors indicative
of where the right of control exists." Id. at 345, 75 N.W.2d at 222.
68. 25 App. Div. 2d 538, 267 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1966).

69.

See text accompanying notes 60-68 supra.

November 1969]

HOSPITAL LIABILITY

Corporate Negligence
The other theory on which hospital liability for negligence is based,
corporate negligence, is undergoing an even more significant expansion.
Under the theory of corporate negligence, liability is imposed on the
hospital if the hospital fails to fulfill a duty it owes directly to the
patient.1 0 It will be seen that the duties owed by a hospital directly to
the patient have expanded in recent years, just as has the concept of
who is a hospital employee for respondeat superior purposes. 71
Traditionally, the hospital has owed a direct duty to the patient to
72
furnish equipment that is not defective, improper, or inadequate.
Thus, if the harm is caused by a defect in the hospital's apparatus, as
opposed to the negligent use of the apparatus by an employee, the hospital can be held directly liable under the theory of corporate negligence.
There is no duty, however, to furnish the newest, most modem equipment on the market; it is enough if the hospital furnishes equipment
reasonably suited to assure proper operation and customarily used in
similar circumstances in other hospitals in the area."3 However, if it
does not have the proper equipment and facilities to treat adequately
a patient's condition, a hospital might have a duty to transfer the patient
to another hospital that does have such facilities. For example, in
the 1963 California case of Carrasco v. Bankoff,74 the court held the
hospital liable when a patient with third-degree burns was retained in
the hospital for 53 days and the institution did not have facilities for
skin grafting or for the "open" method treatment of burns. Because it
was established that these facilities were required for proper treatment
of third-degree burns, the hospital was under a duty to transfer the
patient to another hospital.
The hospital has also traditionally had the duty, as an owner of
land and buildings, to exercise reasonable care with respect to the maintenance of buildings and grounds.7 5 In this regard, the law of most
jurisdictions makes distinctions based on the relationship between the
injured person and the property owner. If the person is merely a
"trespasser" or a "licensee" (one who, unlike a trespasser, has the owner's
consent to enter upon the property),76 the property owner merely has a
70. HA HosPrrAL LAW MANuAL, Negligence ch. I, at 3 (1968).
71. See text accompanying notes 34-71 supra.
72. See HA HosPrrAL LAw MANuAL, Negligence ch. I, at 18a (1964).
73. Emory Univ. v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752, 755, 120 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1961).
74. 220 Cal. App. 2d 230, 33 Cal. Rptr. 673.
75. HA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 22-23 (1961).
76. PROSSER § 60, at 386-87. In California, however, a recent case has abrogated
the distinctions based upon plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
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duty to give warning of highly dangerous conditions of the property
known to him. 77 The property owner, however, owes a higher duty
to an invitee, 78 a person not merely allowed, but encouraged to enter
the premises,' 9 e.g., hospital patients and their visitors.8 ° Generally,
the duty requires the exercise of reasonable care in making the premises safe for the invitee, and in warning him of dangerous conditions
which are known to the property owner, or which could be discovered
by him with reasonable care. 8 '
The most far-reaching extension of the corporate negligence concept occurred in the celebrated 1965 Illinois case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital. 2 In this case, a cast had been
applied to the patient's leg improperly and although the patient complained bitterly of pain and the nurses had noticed the toes of the
patient turning blue and the odor of decayed tissue was evident, necessary competent attention was delayed to the extent that an amputation
had to be performed. Among other things, the Illinois Supreme Court
extended the scope of duty of the hospital by defining it in terms of the
hospital's by-laws, state statutes, and accreditation rules,8 3 in addition
77.

PROSSER § 58, at 371-72; id. § 60, at 389-90.

78.

flA HosPITAL LAW MANUAL, Negligence ch. I, at 23 (1961).

79. Id.
80. Starr v. Emory Univ., 93 Ga. App. 864, 93 S.E.2d 399 (1956) (patient);
Greenfield v. Hosp. Ass'n, 258 App. Div. 352, 16 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1940) (visitor).
But see Sandwell v. Elliott Hosp., 92 N.H. 41, 24 A.2d 273 (1942), where the court
treated a visitor as a licensee. Although the charitable immunity doctrine is not recognized in New Hampshire, the fact that the hospital was of charitable nature was taken
into consideration to lessen its liability. Accord, Nickerson v. Laconia Hosp. Ass'n,
96 N.H. 482, 79 A.2d 5 (1951).
81. In the few states that base charitable immunity on the implied waiver theory,
the patient, although he may be owed a high duty of care by the hospital because he is
an "invitee," will be prevented from suing the hospital for breach of that duty, since
he is a "beneficiary" of the charity. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra. As a
practical matter, therefore, in these states the hospital really has no duty of due care
whatsoever toward the patient.
82. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
83. Standards for hospital accreditation are promulgated by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals. The Joint Commission is sponsored by the American
College of Surgeons, the American College of Physicians, the American Hospital
Association, and the American Medical Association. Its purpose is, among other things,
to establish standards for the operation of hospitals and other health care facilities,
and to conduct surveys of health care institutions and accredit such institutions to
assure compliance with the standards. The enactment in 1965 of Health Insurance for
the Aged Act (Medicare), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.) heightened the work of the Joint Commission by stating
that institutions participating in the Medicare program must meet and maintain certain
minimum standards of patient care; the law cited the standards of the Joint Commission
as constituting that minimum level of care. See U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e)-(g) (Supp. IV,
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to the standards of care followed by other hospitals in the community.,
The court held that, on the basis of these standards, the hospital could
be found liable for failing to review the attending physician's work or
to require consultation. 5 As a consequence, a hospital has a duty
to be aware of the care being given a patient by his physician and to act
when it becomes apparent that this care is below the standard warranted
by the patient's condition. Such a duty focuses on a shared, joint
responsibility for the standards of patient care; in order to conform to
the standards of its own by-laws, state statutes, and accreditation standards, a hospital administration must stimulate its medical staff to establish procedures for consultation among physicians and for review of
the work of each staff physician.
In a 1967 Illinois case, Mauer v. Highland Park Hospital Foundation,"" the court construed Darling as laying the basis for imposing liability on a hospital for the imprudent or careless selection of its staff
members. 7 The Darling rationale apparently was also applied in a
1967 Washington case, Pederson v. Dumouchel,8s in which the Washington Supreme Court held that the hospital was negligent as a matter
of law for allowing the deviation from the standard of good practice
embodied in its own rules.8 9 Clearly, the Darling case and its offspring, by establishing the direct duty of a hospital to furnish competent
medical care or be held liable for failure to do so, have had a substantial impact on hospital liability.
In summary, both of the bases of hospital liability for negligence,
corporate negligence and respondeat superior, are expanding, with the
1969). At that time the accredited hospitals numbered 4,606 which represented about
65 percent of the then existing hospitals and about 88 percent of all hospital beds.
Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hospitals, Preface to PROVISIONAL DRAFT PROPOSED
In 1966 the Joint ComSTANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS at iii (1969).
mission undertook a study of the standards to obtain two objectives:
(a) To raise and strengthen the standards from the present level of minimum
essential to the level of optimum achievable and to assure their suitability to the
modern state of the art.
(b) To simplify and clarify the language of standards and interpretation to remove
all possible ambiguities and misunderstandings. Id. The revised standards after a
long and sometimes heated debate within the hospital field were adopted by the Joint
Commission on August 9, 1969 and are scheduled to go into effect January 1, 1970.
The impact of these much more comprehensive standards on hospital liability in light of
the Darling case remains to be seen.
84. 33 IM.2d at 331, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
85. Id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
86. 90 IMI.App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (1967).
87. Id. at 415, 232 N.E.2d at 779.
88. 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
89. Id. at 80, 431 P.2d at 978.
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result that the hospital is held legally responsible in a growing number
of situations.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
As we have seen, along with the expanding opportunities for an
injured individual to bring suit against a hospital has come a corresponding increase in the number of negligent acts for which a hospital
is legally responsible. Even so, the individual still cannot hold the
hospital liable for the injury unless he can produce persuasive evidence
of the hospitars negligence.
The courts originally applied the old English doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to the many hospital cases in which the patient had been
negligently injured while unconscious, under the influence of anesthesia,
or otherwise incapacitated, in order to partially compensate for the
almost insurmountable burden of proof facing the plaintiff in such a
case.90 Their purpose was clearly expressed by the California Supreme
Court in the 1944 landmark case of Ybarra v. Spangard:91
Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who [during the operation] received permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously
the result of someone's negligence, would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose
to disclose the identity
of the negligent person and the facts es92
tablishing liability.
The doctrine permits the plaintiff's case to go to the jury when the
following factors are shown to exist:
(1) [T]he event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 93
The doctrine, however, has been expanded in several significant
respects, and, in reality, often serves a purpose far beyond its originally
stated one. In the first place, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur traditionally was inapplicable where the cause of the injury may be attributed
to any one of several causes, some of which were not within defendant's
control; 4 but this principle has been modified in recent cases. In the
1966 case of Larrabeev. United States,9" a child, delivered by a military
90.
(1944).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See the discussion in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at 689.
PROSSER § 39, at 218.
Id. at 222-23.
254 F. Supp. 613 (1966).
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physician in an Air Force hospital in California, received birth injuries
resulting in blindness in one eye; plaintiff alleged that the negligent
use of forceps by the physician was the cause of the damage. Although
there was also testimony indicating an intra-uterine infection as a possible causative factor, the court permitted res ipsa loquitur to be inThe court quoted with approval the language of an earlier
voked."
California case which said that the doctrine is applicable "where, in the
light of past experience, (a) the accident was probably the result of
someone's negligence and (b) the defendant is probably the responsible
person [and that in such cases] [t]he plaintiff need not produce evi' 7
dence excluding all possible causes other than defendant's negligence.'
To the same effect is a 1966 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Beaudoin
v. Watertown Memorial Hospital.98 In that case, plaintiff alleged that
she received second-degree burns during surgery (for removal of a
vaginal polyp). Although the defendant's evidence suggested other
possible causes of the bums, the court held that res ipsa was still appropriate under the circumstances." 9
The doctrine has been broadened in a second respect. As stated
previously, one of the preconditions for the invocation of res ipsa is that
the injury was caused by an instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive control. In some recent cases, however, the "instrumentality"
has been extended to persons as well as objects or equipment. One
example is the 1967 Montana Supreme Court case of Gormley v. MonThe plaintiff had suffered a broken arm
tana Deaconess Hospital.'
when she was either unconscious
occurring
during a grand mal seizure
or under the influence of drugs following a surgical hysterectomy. The
court held the doctrine applicable, saying that it was not necessary for
the plaintiff to prove the precise "thing" causing her injury and that
the hospital nurses were the "instrumentalities" whose negligence could
have caused the injury. 1
Res ipsa has been broadened in yet a third respect. One of the
conditions usually listed as necessary for the application of the doctrine
is that the injury must not have been the result of any voluntary action on the part of the injured party. In the 1967 case of Vistica v.
Presbyterian Hospital and Medical Center,' the California Supreme
96.
97.
(1965).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 616.
Id., quoting Inouye v. Black, 238 Cal. App. 2d 31, 33, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315
32 Wis. 2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166 (1966).
Id. at 138, 145 N.W.2d at 169.
149 Mont. 12, 423 P.2d 301 (1967).
Id. at 20-22, 423 P.2d at 305-06.
67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967).
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Court significantly modified the above condition on the applicability
of res ipsa. Mrs. Vistica, who had had a long history of mental illness
and previous suicide attempts, was admitted to the Presbyterian Hospital Psychiatric Unit, which operated on the "open ward" pattern.
Ten days after admission to the hospital, she committed suicide. The
day before her suicide, the hospital became aware that she might jump
from a partially opened, transome type window located in the ward
solarium; and her physician, upon being notified of this, ordered 24hour surveillance of the patient. Although the doctor reemphasized
to the nurses on the following day that the patient was not to be left
alone," 3 that evening Mrs. Vistica was left unattended for about eight
minutes; the only nurse on the ward was busy with other patients at the
far end of the hall. Shortly thereafter, the patient's body was found
lying on the ground beneath the solarium window. The solarium furniture was found arranged so that a person could climb up to the window and jump out. There was uncontested evidence that the "open
04
ward" system, which involves unlocked doors, was sound.1
The California Supreme Court held, among other things, that "a
plaintiff may properly rely on res ipsa loquitur even though he has
participated in the events leading to the accident if the evidence excludes his conduct as the responsible cause."' 0 5 The trial court failed
to explain to the jury that decedent's voluntary conduct had to be "the
responsible cause of her death" in order not to entitle her to the benefit
of res ipsa. 0°
The 1968 case of Meier v. Ross General Hospital'0 7 makes it
even clearer that res ipsa loquitur can be used to establish the negligence
of a hospital that is responsible for the care of a mentally disturbed
patient with known suicidal tendencies who succeeds in committing
suicide while in the hospital's care. Under circumstances nearly identical to those in Vistica, the California Supreme Court held:
"The plaintiff [decedent] is seldom entirely static, and it is not
necessary that he be completely inactive, but merely that there
103. Because the psychiatric ward was operated on the "open ward" pattern--so
that patients would not feel imprisoned-the patient was relatively free from restraint,
and thus the need for suicide precautions was particularly evident to her doctor. Id. at
467, 432 P.2d at 195, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 470, 432 P.2d at 196, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 581, quoting with approval the
language of the text from Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 444-45,
247 P.2d 344, 348-49 (1952).
106. Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 470-71, 432 P.2d 193, 196, 62
Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (1967).
107. 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968).
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be evidence removing the inference of his own responsibility" .... In the present case, decedent had attempted suicide
and had been placed in the hospital because of his depressed state
and physical injuries. Under such circumstances . . those
charged with the care and treatment of a patient, who know of
facts from which it might reasonably be concluded that a patient
would be likely to harm himself in the absence of preclusive
measures, must use reasonable care to prevent such harm. 0 8
It is clear in the two above cases that the court is not eliminating
the concept of contributory negligence from the set of preconditions
to the application of res ipsa loquitur. It is saying, rather, that for a
plaintiff's own actions to constitute a defense on the grounds that they
are the "responsible cause" of the injury, the plaintiff must be responsible for his actions. The court is thus holding that where the
plaintiff is mentally disturbed to the point that there is a known danger
of his attempting to take his own life and for those reasons he has been
placed in the professional care of a hospital, it is the hospital that is
responsible for the patient's acts, not the patient. The hospital therefore is the "responsible cause" of the injury, not the mentally disturbed
patient. The effect of the above decisions is to enlarge the scope of
hospital liability by allowing such patients to recover.
The most significant extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
however, was made by the California Supreme Court in the case of
Clark v. Gibbons.0 0 In that case, the anesthesia wore off too soon
and the operation was therefore concluded prematurely. The condition of the patient prevented a second operation in time to achieve
success. There was evidence, independent of the doctrine of res ipsa,
sufficient to support the jury finding of negligence against the anesthesiologist and surgeon. However, the trial court also instructed the jury
on res ipsa, and the supreme court upheld that instruction, stating that
this was a proper case for it." 0 There was evidence that when due care
is used, premature termination of anesthesia is rare; but there was absolutely no evidence indicating that in those few cases in which an anesthetic does terminate prematurely, it is more probably than not caused
by negligence. Thus, as two justices vigorously pointed out, there was
no basis whatever for inferring the most important precondition to the
application of res ipsa: that the accident be of a kind that ordinarily
bespeaks a negligent cause." 1 The majority did not accept rarity (of
108. Id. at 427, 445 P.2d at 524-25, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 at 908-09.
109. 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967).
110. Id. at 414, 426 P.2d at 535, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
111. Id. at 415-16, 422, 426 P.2d at 536-37, 541, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37, 141
(concurring opinions of Traynor, C.J., and Tobriner, J.).
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accidents when due care is used) alone as a basis for res ipsa.1 2 It
stated that when such rarity is combined with proof of specific acts of

negligence of a type that would have caused the injury complained of,
then "the likelihood of a negligent cause may be sufficiently great that
the jury may properly conclude that the accident was more probably than
Although that statement
not the result of someone's negligence.""'
might be appropriate for counsel to make in arguing to the jury that

it could infer from evidence of defendant's negligent conduct that
such conduct caused injury, wholly without regard to the doctrine of
res ipsa, it has no relation to res ipsa itself. Res ipsa loquitur involves
the inferences of negligence that may be drawn from the mere happening of the accident; if the injury, itself, does not give rise to these inferences, then the addition of direct evidence of negligence, which rationally has nothing to do with the doctrine, should not make res ipsa
applicable.
As Justice Tobriner pointed out, "in that limited number of cases

in which rare and inexplicable accidents occur in the operating room,"
the doctrine seems to be serving a new purpose.:"'

This new purpose is

112. In some cases the California Supreme Court has relied upon the rarity of the
accident alone to support an inference of negligence. In most of these cases there was a
calculated risk of injury to the patient inherent in the medical operation, risks which
a careful physician would balance against the gains to be expected from the treatment.
As one writer notes: "It is inevitable that even minor injury, injections . . . and
many other medical procedures should occasionally produce serious injury or fatality
which is, nevertheless, no ones fault." Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California
Medical Malpractice Law: Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 251, 270 (1962). Furthermore, it is implicit in the phrase "calculated risk" that
the possible injurious result will be unusual. California courts, says Rubsamen, seem to
apply a logic to this situation which can be expressed in the following syllogistic
form:
Major premise: Certain types of treatment are very common in medicine.
Minor Premise: It is rare that trouble develops following such treatment.
Conclusion: If trouble does follow such treatment, an inference arises that someone has been negligent. Id.
But to say that it ordinarily does not happen absent negligence is a statement that
cannot be made without the support of an expert witness. If there is medical
proof of an inevitable occurence of an untoward event, then there is no logical
basis for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 271.
Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 51 Cal. 2d 832, 337 P.2d 97 (1959); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d
811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Cavero v. Franklin Gen'l Benevolent Soc'y, 36 Cal. 2d
301, 223 P.2d 471 (1950), are cases which apparently follow this line of reasoning.
But see Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962);
Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 88 P.2d 695 (1939). For an extended analysis
of the various applications of res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases in California
see Rubsamen, supra.
113. 66 Cal. 2d at 413, 426 P.2d at 534, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
114. Id. at 414, 426 P.2d at 535, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Tobriner, J.)(concurring
opinion).
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indicated by the justice:
In the light of the expansion of res ipsa loquitur undertaken by
• . . the majority opinion in the present case, there can be little
doubt that the net effect of the doctrine is to shift from plaintiffs
to defendants the cost of a certain number of unexplainable accidents in which no meaningful basis exists for finding the defendants
at fault.11 5
And again:
[With such expansion, the court is] pursuing the laudable goal of
shifting the losses occasioned by such accidents to the parties best
116
able to protect against them through insurance ....
1 17
As has been stated, the doctrine of res ipsa assures the plaintiff
of reaching the jury; although it is often emphasized that the defendant
may rebut the inference of negligence with his own evidence and that
the doctrine only warrants, but does not compel, the inference of negligence, the sympathy of juries for plaintiffs faced with disastrous losses
is well-known. Thus the plaintiff has won much of his battle, especially in the more sympathetic situations, by merely getting his case
before the jury. He then has a good chance of obtaining some level
of monetary judgment, wholly without regard to whether he previously
proves the negligent cause of the injury. In all, the expanded doctrine
of res ipsa, allowing the plaintiff to reach the jury in an increasing number of situations, does indeed seem to be serving a "risk-shifting purpose" by holding physicians and hospitals strictly liable in certain cases.
In this regard, consideration will be given below to the very pertinent observation made by Justice Tobriner: "If public policy demands that defendants be held responsible for unexplained accidents
without a reasoned finding of fault, such responsibility should be fixed
openly and uniformly, not under the guise of negligence and at the
discretion of a jury."""
Negligence-Affirmative Duty and Standard of Care
Not only is the plaintiff able to get the issue of negligence to the
jury in more cases, the concept of "negligence" itself seems to be
expanding. Before discussing the expansion of this concept, however,
it should be noted that because the hospital premises are used largely
by those who are (in some manner) infirm rather than by people of
115. Id. at 418, 426 P.2d at 538, 58 Cal. Rptr. 138.
116. Id. at 414, 426 P.2d at 535, 58 Cal. Rptr. 135.
117. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
118. 66 Cal. 2d at 414, 416, 426 P.2d at 534, 537, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 137
(Tobriner, I.) (concurring opinion).
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average physical condition, a higher degree of reasonable care is imposed on the hospital (than on other places of public resort) in keeping
its premises in reasonably safe condition. As to the expansion of the
negligence concept, at a hearing on the subject of Malpractice Liability
before the California Senate Subcommittee of General Research in
October 1967, James Ludlam, legal counsel for the California Hospital
Association, stated: "The fact that we do so much for our patients
has meant that the patients and their protectors, the juries, have asked
for more in the way of a standard of care."' 19
As we have already seen, the Darling case has broadened the
direct duty of the hospital to furnish competent medical care. 120 In
addition, we have seen the expanding duty of the hospital nurse to
use her independent judgment and to challenge orders from the attending physician that seem dubious.' 2 ' There are other indications
that the duty of care towards the patient is becoming more stringent.
In a 1967 Washington case, Adams v. State,'2 2 a mental patient
escaped from the hospital grounds and jumped in front of an automobile, seriously injuring herself. The reader may recall that in the
California case of Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital and Medical Center, 23 the hospital staff was aware that the mental patient had attempted
suicide the day before in the very same manner inwhich she ultimately
did commit suicide. On the other hand, in the Adams case, although
the hospital staff was aware of the patient's tendency to inflict self-harm
because of her previous actions, the mental patient had never before attempted to injure herself in the particular manner in which she
did.'
For a defendant to be held liable, it must be shown not only
that the defendant's negligence caused the injury, but also that the resulting injury to the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of that negligence.'2 5 Thus, the defendant state in Adams argued that
it was not liable-since the patient had never before, while at the hospital, attempted to "escape," the incident resulting in injury was unforeseeable. 2 "
119. Transcript, Hearings on Malpractice Liability Before the Subcomm. of General Research of the Senate of the State of California at 31 (October 17, 1967)

[hereinafter referred to as Transcript, MalpracticeLiability Hearings].
120. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
71 Wash. 2d 414, 429 P.2d 109 (1967).
67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967).
71 Wash. 2d at 423, 429 P.2d at 114.

125.
126.

PROSSER § 50, at 288.
71 Wash. 2d at 423, 429 P.2d at 114.
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The court could have met this defense directly by saying that the
particular manner in which the patient injured herself was foreseeable;
in other words, that it was foreseeable that if the hospital grounds were
left unguarded, a mental patient with suicidal or self-harming tendencies
would try to escape and injure himself although never before attempting an escape. The court did not so restrict itself, but instead stated
broadly that it was enough that the hospital employees foresaw that the
'
patient "might commit an act which would result in injury to herself. M
Such a statement, however, can be made about any mental patient
with suicidal or self-harming tendencies. The court seems to be placing
a duty on the hospital to guard these patients against all manner of
suicide or self-harm, no matter how unusual, or risk the possibility of
being held liable for failure to do so. As the defendant state argued, 12
the practical effect of the court's ruling was to impose strict liability on
a hospital for whatever self-inflicted harm is done by such patients, although the court disagreed with this analysis. 2 9
A Medical Injury Commission
We have seen that it is becoming easier for an injured individual
to maintain, and win, an action against a hospital. The doctrines of
charitable immunity and governmental immunity from suit are dying;
the bases of hospital liability are expanding as the hospital's defenses
to the respondeat superior doctrine are becoming more limited and the
doctrine of corporate negligence is growing. The standard of care owed
by the hospital and its employees to the patient is becoming more
stringent, or in other words, the concept of negligence in this situation
is expanding; furthermore, it is becoming easier for the plaintiff's case to
reach a sympathetic jury. The lesson of more and more cases appears
to be that everyone injured by medical negligence or by an unavoidable
accident should be compensated.
The hospital field is not unique in experiencing this shift in liability
from the plaintiff to the defendant; quite the contrary, the process we
have observed in the hospital field is merely a small segment of a
much larger phenomenon that is taking place in our society. As
one attorney commented: "[Whether we are willing to accept it or
not, we are practicing in an age of expanding liability, and this is true
whether we are talking about the legal profession, the medical profession, the government . . . charitable organizations . . . . [or] the
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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area of products liability."''3
This overall phenomenon, in turn, is indicative of a shifting societal concern-an increasing sympathy for the
victims of accidents unavoidably cause by mass operations.
For the hospital, what is at stake is the cost of the liability insurance
premium, a cost of no small importance. For example, over the past
10 years the cost to California hospitals for one million dollars of liability insurance coverage rose from $4.17 to $18.02 per bed per month,
while from 1967 to 1968 this cost increased by over 40 percent. 131
The hospital's rising cost of insurance coverage, however, is not the
only shortcoming of the present system. These figures do not include
the cost of the premiums paid by doctors, nurses, and staff members for
individual coverage, and with rates for medical malpractice insurance
rising dramatically, these individuals are experiencing the same spiraling
cost of insurance coverage.

132

In his criticism of the present system, Professor Ehrenzweig has
aptly listed the following shortcomings of the present system:
1. There remains the great burden on time, energy and
peace of mind that is imposed on potential defendants by the continuous threat of strike suits by claim-prone patients and by the
possibility of jury verdicts in excess of available or economically
feasible insurance coverage. In the face of these threats both
physicians and hospitals are likely to become increasingly wary of
fruitful experimentation and hazardous treatments.
2. The present possibility of suits against several persons
for the same incident compel each of such persons (including the
hospital, the nurse and the physician) to carry his own liability
insurance and thus to increase the over-all premium load to the
disadvantage of the public as the ultimate consumer.
3. The wastefulness of multiple liabilities and premiums
by subrogation claims among
also appears in the redistributiondistributed.
liability insurers, of losses already
4. Since liability insurance is not compulsory, even the most
valid claim may remain unsatisfied if the defendant is insolvent.
5. Since liability coverage usually excludes liability for criminal acts and acts performed in the state of intoxication or under
the influence of drugs, and since the policy will usually contain
conditions concerning settlement and cooperation, the patient may
remain uncompensated even if the defendant carries insurance.
6. Finally, and perhaps most important, in many cases such
be paid for
recovery as is ultimately obtained by the patient, must
33
with the strain and expense of protracted litigation.'
130. Mueller, The Expanding Duty of the Hospital to the Patient,47 NEB. L. REV.
337, 338 (1967).
131. LINDER, GROUP LIABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, Exhibit 1 (California Hospital
Ass'n, Mar. 14, 1969).
132. See Transcript, Malpractice Liability Hearings,supra note 119, at 60-64.
133. Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed First
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Another disadvantage of the present system, and one of no less
importance to the physician, is the potential destruction of his professional career by a well-publicized malpractice case and jury verdict.
The injury giving rise to this publicized case can occur at any time,
and with certain medical procedures the physician and his hospital
face the risk of lawsuit either way they turn. For instance, as reported
in the State Senate hearings on medical practice liability, James E.
Ludlam, legal counsel for the California Hospital Association, stated:
For example, it is legally risky to attempt a cardiac resuscitation.
If there is brain damage the judgment could be in the hundreds of
thousands, but if no attempt to resuscitate is made, then a wrongful
death case may ensue. This is a judgment that must be made in
literally seconds and involves many profound issues that can all be
reviewed at extended leisure by a jury with 20-20 back vision.
I think this is a very serious part of the problem to which we are
referring because we are dealing in judgment areas. . . Now,
we are not attempting to justify substandard practice, but our
impression is if we watch this field that it isn't the substandard doctors that are being sued and against whom these big judgments are
coming in. In many instances these big judgments are in our very
best hospitals and very best doctors. It is not because they are
incompetent, but because they engage in a highly skilled and technical work where any mistake
of judgment is classified as culpable
negligence with liability. 3 4
In hopes of offsetting these risks and the concomitant dramatic
rise in malpractice insurance premiums, physicians in California have
turned to the state legislature for relief; their efforts have not been too
successful. 3 5 Similarly arbitration has been suggested as an alterStep Toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice", 31 U. CH. L.
Rav. 279, 283-84 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Ehrenzweig].
134. Transcript, MalpracticeLiability Hearings,supra note 119, at 36-37.
135. The following legislation was either sponsored or endorsed by the California
Medical Association or by individual physicians:
1. AB 259 (1969), enacted, CAL. CODE CMv. PROC. § 405.8. This act requires
plaintiff on motion by defendant in a malpractice action to file a cost bond
of up to $500 for each professional defendant named up to a maximum bond of
$1,000.
2. SB 519 (1969), enacted, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144.5. This relieves from
liability any physician or surgeon who in good faith renders medical care to a
person for a medical complication arising from prior care by another person so
licensed.
3. SB 709 (1969), enacted, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1426. The hospital
and all members of the licensed hospital's cardio-pulmonary resuscitation "rescue
team" are relieved from liability for acts or omissions of such rescue team.
4. SB 351 (1969). Defeated in the Senate. This bill would have altered the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.
5. SB 943 (1969). Defeated in the Senate. This would have limited damages
recoverable in "Professional Malpractice" actions to $150,000.
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native. 136 Again this merely carries the same tort system over into
another forum, with less ability of the attorneys to control the proceedings and thus even less predictability of result. The answer, in our

opinion, does not rest in patching up a system of assessing financial re6. S. Res. 54 (1969). Defeated in the Senate. It would have urged the State
Bar of California to establish reasonable guidelines for the detection and
elimination of non-meritorious medical malpractice lawsuits and for the discouragement of contingency fees in such cases.
7. AB 134 (1969). Defeated in the Assembly. This bill would have altered
the burden of proof in a malpractice case to require plaintiff to prove (1) the
degree of knowledge or skill possessed, or degree of care ordinarily exercised,
by other persons in the same specialty or discipline practiced by the defendant
in a similar community as the defendant, (2) the defendant lacked such skill
and knowledge or failed to exercise such degree of care, (3) that as a proximate
result of defendant's lack of such knowledge or skill or failure to exercise such
degree of care, plaintiff sustained injuries. The bill added that there would be
no presumption or inference of negligence on the part of defendant.
8. AB 135 (1969). Defeated in the Assembly. The bill would have altered
statute of limitations for a malpractice case by having the one year statute begin
on the date of the wrongful act and not from any other date, except upon proof
of fraud or intentional concealment.
Defeated in the Assembly. It would have required a
9. AB 1046 (1969).
separate jury trial on the issue of liability in an action for professional negligence
or malpractice upon motion of either party made within a specified time.
10. AB 1047 (1969). Defeated in the Assembly. This would have required that
damages awarded for purposes of future medical treatment be deposited into
court to be disbursed under supervision of the court.
11. AB 1261 (1969). Defeated in the Assembly. This bill would have had the
superior court of each county establish and maintain a commission on personal injury awards to be available upon motion of either party in certain malpractice cases. It also provided that the commission's finding would be evidence
to be considered by the jury.
12. AB 1756 (1969). Defeated in the Senate. According to this bill any party
prior to commencement of a trial would have been authorized to serve an offer in
writing to the other party to have judgment taken based upon the offer. If
the party to whom the offer is made refused to accept it prior to trial and there
was a judgment less favorable to him, that party would have been barred from
recovering costs; the court would then have been authorized to order him to
pay various costs of the other party, including fees of expert witnesses who
were not regular employees of any party.
136. The California Hospital Association and the California Medical Association
are sponsoring a pilot project in Southern California involving arbitration of medical
malpractice disputes. Rules of arbitration have been developed in conjunction with
the American Arbitration Association, and these rules have been incorporated into the
standard "Conditions of Admission" form used by the participating hospitals. The
patient has a 30 day option following discharge to decline arbitration as the sole means
of resolving these malpractice disputes. This option feature was added in the hopes of
avoiding the contract of adhesion difficulty. The hospital arbitration regulations are
broad enough to cover all legal disputes between the hospital and the patient, including
collection of the unpaid hospital bill. Hospital Arbitration Regulations, CaliforniaHospital Association (1969).
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lief for malpractice accidents on the basis of finding fault-a will
-o'-the-wisp at best-the answer lies in changing the system itself. The
administrative cost, including delay and financial strain on the plaintiff,
the disasterous economic and professional impact upon the physican
and the hospital, are too high a price to pay to maintain the present
system.
It is believed that the system could be made less costly, consume
less time, and could return more benefits to those injured through the
mass operation of medical practice by instituting a medical injury commission to adjudicate claims and administer compensation to the victim.
Broadly outlined, under the commission system, strict liability would be
substituted for negligence as the basis for recovery; the complainant
would merely have to show that he was injured through a "hospital
accident"; the amount of recovery would be administered by the commission according to schedules of compensation; attorney's fees would
be fixed by the commission; the procedure before the commission would
be of an informal nature; and the system would be financed by requiring hospitals to carry insurance either with a state fund established
for the purpose or with a qualified private carrier.
Strict Liability
Strict liability may well be a desirable basis for recovery in cases
where a person has been injured through a medical accident whether
someone is at fault or not. The incisive statement of Justice Tobriner
in the California Supreme Court case of Clark v. Gibbons87 is pertinent
here: "If public policy demands that defendants be held responsible
for unexplained accidents without a reasoned finding of fault, such
responsibility should be fixed openly and uniformly, not under the guise
1 88
of negligence and at the discretion of a jury. 1
Indeed, it might be noted that several arguments traditionally utilized against the charitable immunity doctrine can be utilized as arguments against discriminating between those patients injured accidentally
and those injured by an employee's or hospital's negligence. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court in the 1966 case of Bell v. Presbytery of
Boise,139 in eliminating the charitable immunity doctrine, argued:
"Personal injury is no less painful, disabling, costly or damage-producing simply because negligent harm is inflicted by a charitable insti137. 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967).
138. Id. at 416, 426 P.2d at 536, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
139. 91 Idaho 374, 421 P.2d 745 (1966).
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tution rather than a noncharitable one.' 140 It can similarly be argued
that "personal injury is no less painful, disabling, costly or damageproducing simply because" the harm is inflicted by an unavoidable
accident rather than by someone's negligence.
The California case of Meier v. Ross General Hospital,'41 discussed above, 4 2 illustrates the issue of who should bear the cost of an
innovating medical procedure. In that case the hospital, in line with
its "open door policy," which is generally considered to be best for rehabilitating psychiatric patients with suicidal tendencies, did not remove the window cranks in the psychiatric wing, whereupon a mental
patient with a prior history of attempted suicide jumped to his death
from a second floor window. The court of appeal refused to hold that
the defendant hospital was negligent as a matter of law in operating on
the "open door policy," stating that "[t]he course of treatment followed
necessarily involved a calculated risk that the patient might harm himself.' 1 43 Although the decision was reversed on another ground by the
supreme court,' both courts were correct in holding that the hospital
was not necessarily negligent in adopting and implementing the scheme.
When the costs involved in such an innovative procedure, including the
risk of a certain incremental amount of suicide and self-harm successes,
were consciously weighed against the benefits of such a procedure (in
terms of rehabilitation), the hospital was justified in concluding that,
despite the significant costs of the procedure, its benefits outweighed
such costs.
The pertinent question is not whether such a determination involved negligence, but rather the more fundamental question of whether
negligence is a viable doctrine in this situation. Stated succinctly, the
question becomes: Who should bear the costs of these known and
unavoidable (and non-negligent) losses? On the one hand, under a
strict negligence theory, the individual victims would have to bear the
losses (since, by hypothesis, the adoption and implementation of the
scheme were not negligent). On the other hand, under the doctrine of
strict liability, the cost of these incremental losses would result in a
higher insurance premium to the hospital. This increased cost, however, ultimately would be passed on by the hospital to the ones who are
receiving the peculiar benefits of the new system-the patients.
140.

Id. at 376, 421 P.2d at 747.

141.

69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968).

142.

See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.

143.
144.

Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 67 Cal. Rptr. 471, 477 (1968).
69 Cal. 2d at 434-35, 445 P.2d at 529-30, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14.
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Here again it would be appropriate to examine a traditional argument against charitable immunity: that of the unfairness of forcing the
injured party to contribute indirectly to the charity by refusing him the
opportunity to recover damages. A similar argument might be made
against the unfairness of forcing the injured patient to contribute to
the innovating procedure (by refusing him recovery simply because
the determination and implementation of the procedure were wholly nonnegligent).
Although many people argue that the doctrine of negligence is
necessary to maintain the standards of care of an organization like a
hospital, the facts do not support this conclusion. Under strict liability,
the hospital will still strive to prevent negligence in order to keep its
insurance premium as low as possible. Under the new system, prevention of negligence will no longer produce a liability insurance rate
of zero; but such elimination of negligence will keep the insurance rate
at the minimum, unavoidable-accident level. That the insurance
premium and, particularly, the potential of an increased insurance premium is an effective incentive to maintain the standards of care of an
organization such as a hospital is illustrated by the experience of industry
under Workmen's Compensation plans. 4 5 In studying the industrial
accident rate for the United States and California, one writer has pointed
out that over the long run there has been a "marked downward trend
in the incidence of, and time loss produced by, industrial accidents."',4
More important, the policing of the standard of care should be
approached directly rather than through the random, unpredictible
approach of the current tort system. As stated by one physician:
In this age of complexities involved in medicine it is totally
unfair to impose the responsibility for determining whether a doctor
used good medical judgment or not solely on a group of 12 lay
people. Only physicians can determine whether sound medical
judgment is used in147any given case, if that is what we are really
trying to determine.
MediCal and Medicare have encouraged greater use of internal
hospital peer review mechanisms to avoid the unnecessary utilization of
hospital services and medical procedures so as to hold down the cost
of these two government-financed programs. 48 It is our opinion that
145. See generally Leonard, Insurance Coverage, in CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRlAcTicE 465, 467-77 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1963); CAL. INS. CODE

§§ 11730 et seq.
146. Riesenfeld, Efficacy and Costs of Workmen's Compensation, 49 CALIF. L. REv.
631, 650 (1961).
147. Transcript, Hearings on Malpractice Liability Before the Subcomm. of General Research of the Senate of the State of California at 35 (Dec. 15, 1967).
148. See generally CAL. WEF.& INsT'Ns CODE §§ 14114, 14125.
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similar peer review mechanisms within hospitals, the medical societies,
the Board of Medical Examiners, and the State hospital-licensing agencies can be implemented along similar lines to provide much better
policing of the standards of health care. Certainly the establishment
and maintenance of an on-going system of controls at each of these
levels with the requirement of periodic reports to the appropriate governmental agencies will be more accountable to the physicians, government, and to the general public than the current tort system. There
is no question that the fear of malpractice litigation has encouraged
physicians to implement new standards of care but at the same time it
has also discouraged innovative approaches and procedures. It is submitted that a more direct method of supervising the quality of health
care is preferable both for the patient and the physician.
Criminal Negligence
One of the assumptions of the proposed system is that a saving will
be achieved by reducing litigation costs to defendants as well as plaintiffs. However, if as Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested, an exception
from the commission system is provided for criminal negligence cases, 49
there is the possibility that claimants, in an attempt to receive higher
awards than they might receive through the commission, may take their
claims to court and attempt to prove criminal negligence, whether the
defendant's conduct amounted to criminal negligence or not. Although
the efficacy of the proposed system is not jeopardized by this possibility,
it is jeopardized by the possibility that the courts and, in particular, the
juries will award the plaintiff damages for conduct of the defendant
which does not amount to criminal negligence. If this situation develops, the criminal negligence category, in time, could easily be used
to encompass conduct that is simply ordinary negligence-the exception
might become the rule.
This possibility should not be regarded lightly. It has been documented by two distinguished writers that in the case of air accidents
under the Warsaw convention, the concept of criminal negligence has
become a euphemism for ordinary negligence and a vehicle for bypassing the statutory awards. 5 ' It is also believed by the writers that
much the same thing has occurred in the cases under the California
guest statute.l 5 '
149. Ehrenzweig, supra note 133, at 290.
150. A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 27
(1954); Sand, Limitation of Liability and Passengers' Accident Compensation Under
the Warsaw Convention, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 21 (1962).

151.

CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158.
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other
hand,
criminal negligence should not go unnoticed.
On the
The persons responsible for criminal negligence can be held responsible
for their acts both by the criminal law and by the hospital review
committees discussed above. For these reasons, the writers are of the
opinion that claims for injuries founded upon criminal negligence ought
to be treated the same way under the proposed system as are claims
for ordinary negligence and unavoidable injuries.
Hospital Accident
If strict liability is substituted for negligence as the basis for recovery, the patient will merely have to show the extent of his injury
and that his claimed injury was not the proximate result of his condition
when he entered the care of the hospital or its employees. The patient
would not be required to identify any specific injuring party or to prove
causative "negligence." An essential feature of both the present system
and the proposed system is that a patient is *not compensated for economic loss caused by the disease or other harm which originally led
him to seek medical care. Such losses are compensated by private or
governmental medical insurance programs.
The losses which the proposed system is intended to compensate
are those that naturally arise from what we today identify as negligence,
as well as the unavoidable accidents which occur in the mass operation
of today's medical practice. Yet, one of the difficulties inherent in a
system where recovery for medical injuries is based on strict liability is
to distinguish between two situations, each of which may result in
economic loss to the patient, but only one of which should be compensated for under the proposed system. One situation arises when the
patient's post treatment condition is the product of the risk involved in
any medical treatment; the other arises when the patient's treatment
produces an abnormal result not within the risk of the treatment.
An example of the first situation is the development of an infection in an open wound that has been subjected to treatment. Such
a development would ordinarily be considered a natural consequence of
the patient's original condition when he entered the hospital, and any
resultant economic loss would be covered, if at all, by the patient's own
health insurance. Examples of the second situation would include the
leaving of a sponge or other foreign matter in the patient, 52 or an injury to a part of the patient which is not the subject of treatment, such
as an injury to an arm when the patient has had an operation on his
152.

E.g., Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936).
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leg. 15 3 Utilizing this distinction, therefore, that a patient has suffered
what to him is an unexpected result in the course of medical treatment
would not necessarily be sufficient reason to make the hospital liable,
even under a system of strict liability. If the distinction discussed above
is not made, the hospitals become insurers against all undesirable results-a situation that it is believed would create too great a financial
burden for hospitals to carry. Probably no single term can adequately describe this distinction; but for the sake of convenience, some
term must be adopted; and the term "hospital accident," which was first
propounded by Professor Ehrenzweig, 54 is used here to describe this
distinction.
While the word "accident" ordinarily connotes something sudden,
unusual or unexpected, such as an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward
event that is not expected or designed, 15 5 it would not be so limited
under the proposed system. As Professor Ehrenzweig has pointed out,
to be useful the term "hospital accident" would have to include "[s]ome
such formula as that now used in malpractice insurance policies, namely
the reference to 'services rendered or which should have been rendered
. . . . ",,5 Perhaps the definition of "accident" as it has evolved under Workmen's Compensation plans would be helpful in identifying
compensable injuries in the scheme of the medical injury commission.
As one writer has pointed out, in the field of Workmen's Compensation
"an unexpected cause or an unexpected result is sufficient to establish
the injury as caused by 'accident'."' 7 Here again, the phrase "unexpected result" would have to refer to a result unexpected according to
medical knowledge at the time of the treatment. The phrase "unexpected result" should not be held to include infections or complications
which occasionally occur from the type of treatment administered even
though the infection or complication might occur in a very small
percentage of cases.
Schedules of Compensation
An essential feature of the proposed system is a schedule of benefits by which much of the uncertainty of the current system would be
eliminated. No attempt, however, will be made here to prescribe in
153. E.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
154. Ehrenzweig, supra note 133, at 284.
155. Morris v. New York Life Ins. Co., 49 F.2d 62, 63 (4th Cir. 1931); Hagger
v. Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 318, 196 S.W.2d 1 (1946); Fenton v. Thorley, [19031
A.C. 443.
156. Ehrenzweig, supra note 133, at 289.
157. Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 1962 INs. L.J. 301, 310.
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detail what such a schedule of benefits might provide. A general discussion of that nature may be found in another article. 158 Rather, the
writers are primarily concerned here with the policy reasons for establishing a schedule of benefits and with the advantages, in general, that
can be derived from such a plan.
Because the claimant would be required to seek compensation
through the medical injury commission whether his injury was the result of an unavoidable accident, ordinary negligence, or criminal negligence, the provision for a schedule of benefits should eliminate a repetition of the astronomical judgments that the medical profession has witnessed in recent years. The writers, however, are in no way suggesting that the schedule of benefits should not compensate the injured
victim. Indeed, great care should be taken to draft a schedule of benefits that does provide adequately for the losses suffered by the injured
victims. All damages now recoverable in malpractice cases, including
some recovery for pain and suffering, might well be included in such a
schedule of benefits. But the awarding of compensation according to
the schedule of benefits should prove to be a more consistent and objective method of compensating the claimant in medical injury cases
than a jury verdict has been. The use of a schedule of benefits as the
basis for determining the amount of an award to be made to the injured
claimant should also aid insurance companies in establishing premiums
for "hospital accident" insurance, that is, what we now call medical
malpractice insurance, which accurately reflect the true risk involvedsomething that is not possible under the present system.
Attorney's Fees

Another essential feature of the proposed system is that attorney's
fees will be set by the commission for each case that comes before it.
It is proposed that attorney's fees be fixed much as they are fixed under the Workmen's Compensation plans. 159 Attorney's fees under the
proposed system should reflect a closer correlation to the time spent on
each case by the attorney than to a percentage of the judgment which he
obtains for his client.
The elimination of any requirement of proving fault or identifying
a particular person as having committed fault in a medical injury case,
together with a schedule of compensation for the injured victim, should
greatly reduce the guesswork involved in this kind of litigation. Since
158. Ehrenzweig, supra note 133, at 284-91.
159. See generally Swezey, Lien Claims, in CALIFORNIA WORxmEN'S COMPENSA7TON
PRACTICE 567, 571-72 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1963).
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a fundamental assumption of the proposed system is that all medical injury victims, whether injured by negligence or not, should receive compensation for their injuries, it seems equitable that the attorney should be
willing to forego a fee based purely upon a percentage of the award or
recovery.
Again, it is believed that this proposal would contribute generally
to a reduction of the costs involved in litigating medical injury cases
and would also aid insurers in making accurate appraisals of the
medical injury risk involved in treating patients in hospitals.
Informal Procedure
To reduce the costs of litigating medical injury claims and to
expedite the hearing of such claims, it is important that the procedure
before the proposed commission be of an informal nature. The person assigned to hear a medical injury case, a referee, for example,
would have at his disposal a panel of doctors upon whom he could call
for advice on any matter pertaining to the victim's claim. Medical and
other testimony by the parties to the action could be received, in most
cases, in the form of written reports or affidavits. The feature of the
proposed system which allows the taking of testimony by written report
or affidavit should be helpful in alleviating the cost of these proceedings.
It is 'well known that today the costs of taking the testimony of an expert witness through his personal appearance before a court or examiner
is much more expensive than the taking of the same testimony by written
report or affidavit. The informal proceedings developed in administering Workmen's Compensation plans are an example of how the proposed
medical injury commission might work. 6 '
Insurance Coverage
Perhaps the greatest saving to be effectuated by the proposed plan
would be in the area of insurance premiums. It is proposed that each
hospital, whether public or private, be required to carry insurance
either with a state fund established for the purpose or with a qualified
private carrier. Since each person injured within the broad definition
of a "hospital accident" would be required to bring his claim to the
medical injury commission, and since his claim, if proven, would have
to be paid for by the hospital in whose care the victim was at the time
of the accident, the number of claims against individual doctors, nurses,
interns, and other members of the medical profession should be greatly
160.

See generally Connolly, Setting for Trial, in CALIFORNIA
196-210 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1963).

PENSATION PRACTICE

WORKMEN'S COM-

November 19691

HOSPITAL LIABILITY

diminished. Under the proposed system neither the hospitals nor their
insurers would be granted a subrogation of the injured victim's claim
allowing them to commence a private civil action against a member of
the health team for the amount of the award which the hospital or the insurer was required to pay to the injured victim. Thus, the proposed
system would largely obviate the necessity for individual members
of the medical profession to carry what is now called medical malpractice insurance. Instead, those individuals who would treat patients away from the hospital, and not as part of the hospital's general
program, could participate in the hospital's insurance coverage on a
group basis by paying an appropriate premium.
It often happens under the present system that there is substantial
double coverage of medical malpractice insurance. A hospital pays
substantial premiums for medical malpractice insurance for each doctor,
nurse, or member of its staff, for the injuries they may cause while
administering medical treatment in the hospital. In addition, the same
individuals who, as mentioned above, are covered through the hospital,
also pay substantial premiums for their own private coverage. These
policies cover the administration of the same medical treatment; but
each policy protects only the insured from the medical malpractice
suits that may be brought against the insured as an individual. Under
the proposed system, much of this double coverage could and would be
eliminated.
Constitutionality of the Proposed System
The problem of the constitutionality of the proposed system should
be no greater obstacle to its adoption than was the constitutional problem of adopting the Workmen's Compensation plans. The problem,
of course, is that the state constitution provides that there shall be no
limitation on the amount of recovery to which an injured person is entitled by reason of the tortious conduct of another. However, appropriate amendment to the state constitution could eliminate this problem,
just as was done with the Workmen's Compensation plans. 161
Conclusion
We have been rather broad and theoretical (as well as selective
161. The authority of the Legislature to confer judicial power upon the Workmen's Compensation Commission is derived wholly from CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 21.
Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 158 P. 218 (1916). See generally New York
Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916); Bancroft, Workmen's Compensation
Coverage and Other Remedies, in CALiF ON.A WORKMEN's COMPENSATION PRACTICE
11-12 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1963).
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in our arguments) in our treatment of the questions of hospital liability, the doctrine of negligence as the basis of hospital liability, and
an alternative system based upon strict liability. We adopted this approach because it was not our purpose to give a detailed analysis of the
numerous and far reaching ramifications of an alternative theory of
liability and its implementation. Nor did we intend to thrust ourselves
into the position of advocates of a strict liability scheme. Rather, we
wanted to suggest a novel (and, we believe, viable) line of argument
in favor of strict liability: that such a system is, to a large extent,
merely a logical extension of our policy reasons for ending charitable
immunity and holding hospitals liable for negligence in the first place.
In addition, we wanted to dispel what we feel is the most widely used,
but erroneous argument against a system of strict liability-that it would
eliminate the incentive to maintain a high standard of care.
More important, however, we wanted to emphasize the need to
reappraise our present system. Indeed, if we are actually approaching
a system of strict liability in effect, we should do so consciously rather
than unconsciously and haltingly. We should fully and consciously
assess this alternative basis of liability, and after such a complete consideration of the scheme, we can either accept, modify, or reject it
completely. Indeed, once we take a direct look at and completely
examine the doctrine and all of its ramifications, we might discover
that public policy does not demand that defendants be held responsible
without a finding of fault.
In any event, we can achieve reasoned, consistent results only after
a complete and intelligent consideration of the question of the basis of
liability. In the writers' opinion, we should stop depending upon
the halting, inconsistent, haphazard, and fickle sympathy of differing
juries to achieve surreptitiously a system that we think we want, although
we are too unsure of our desires to overtly embrace this system or even
to take a good, honest look at the whole problem.

